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DEFINING “NEW JUDGMENT” AFTER MAGWOOD
Patrick Cothern*
Habeas corpus petitioners must navigate the procedural barriers of the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) before courts consider
their petitions on the merits . Among the barriers imposed is a general prohi-
bition on “second or successive” habeas petitions, meaning a petitioner who
previously filed a habeas petition may not bring another, with limited excep-
tions . One such exception, recognized by the Supreme Court in Magwood v.
Patterson, allows for a second habeas petition after the petitioner obtains a
“new judgment .” Magwood and AEDPA, however, left the term “new judg-
ment” undefined . This Note summarizes the history of habeas corpus in the
United States, the passage of AEDPA, and the Magwood decision . It con-
tends that the interpretation of “new judgment” adopted by some circuits is
impermissibly restrictive of the implied right to petition for habeas relief .
Thus, it proposes a simplified interpretation: any judicial change to the origi-
nal judgment renders a “new judgment,” achieving a better balance between
the interests of the petitioner and the state .
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INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus is a writ for which a prisoner may petition to challenge
the legality of their confinement.1 Recently, courts and Congress have weak-
ened this protection by limiting a prisoner’s access to habeas review. A sig-
nificant restriction of access to habeas corpus came from a 2017 en banc
decision by the Eleventh Circuit. In Patterson v . Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections (Patterson II), the Eleventh Circuit held in a 6–5 ruling
that an order preventing the chemical castration portion of the petitioner’s
sentence was not an amended sentence.2 Thus, the window for filing a habe-
as challenge was not “reset.”3 Beyond its disregard of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Magwood v . Patterson4 and divergence from other circuit deci-
sions,5 Patterson II illustrates fundamental problems with the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)6—especially its “second or suc-
cessive” provision.7 AEDPA is the oft-maligned8 act that imposes a host of
procedural requirements on prisoners seeking post-conviction habeas re-
1 . See Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. 849 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
3 . Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1327–28.
4. 561 U.S. 320 (2010).
5 . Compare In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that a new judgment
“resets the habeas counter to zero”), and King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 2015)
(holding that a habeas petitioner avoids the second or successive requirements of AEDPA if
they have received a new judgment), and Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding that the Supreme Court rejected the “one opportunity rule” in Magwood), with
Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1328 (holding that an order to prevent the execution of a portion of
the sentence does not constitute a new judgment).
6. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)–(b) (2012).
8 . See, e .g ., Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in
§ 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (“The quantity and creativi-
ty of academic attacks on the application of the [AEDPA] has prompted . . . . a sense that de-
fense lawyers, and a large part of academia, simply do not like the habeas limiting statutes.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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view.9 The lack of clarity in AEDPA makes it difficult to determine when the
statute’s limitation on second or successive petitions applies in the case of a
“new judgment.”10 Prisoners are left to navigate a system that places obsta-
cles at every step in the name of judicial efficiency, finality, and state comi-
ty.11 These goals are worthy of consideration but have led to excessive
limitation of second or successive habeas petitions. This Note identifies the
point at which the application of the second or successive provision of
AEDPA crosses from efficiency and comity to inconsistency and unconstitu-
tionality. It concludes with a solution to this AEDPA conundrum by propos-
ing an interpretation that simply compares the judgment a petitioner claims
is “new” with the judgment as originally entered, such that any judicially
created change constitutes a new judgment.
Part I explores the history and legal background of habeas petitions and
successive claims under AEDPA. Part II analyzes recent cases and concludes
that there are serious inconsistencies in recent interpretations of the second
or successive provision of AEDPA. These inconsistencies threaten the feder-
al check on state courts’ power to review issues of federal law and potentially
violate petitioners’ due process rights. Part III proposes a rule for when an
amended sentence constitutes a “new judgment” that would correct incon-
sistencies and bring greater predictability to second-in-time habeas petitions.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF HABEAS, AEDPA, AND THE DEBATE
Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is a tool that a petitioner may use to test
the legality of their detention.12 Dating back to at least 1679,13 the evolution
of “the Great Writ”14 has been called the “history of the ever-greater manifes-
tation of ideals of fairness, due process, and humanitarianism.”15 The United
States ingrained access to habeas corpus in Article I, Section IX of the Con-
stitution, which states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safe-
9. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV.
443, 447 (2007) (“AEDPA imposed or fortified several obstacles to habeas relief, although its
provisions were hastily ratified and poorly cohered.” (footnotes omitted)).
10 . See infra Section I.0.
11. See Kovarsky, supra note 9, at 444.
12 . See Habeas Corpus, supra note 1.
13 . See Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and
the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016); Amanda L.
Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635 (2015); see also
William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame,
53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978); Charles Alan Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future,
81 MICH. L. REV. 802 (1983) (reviewing WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS (1980)).
14. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 96 (1807).
15. Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 581 (2008).
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ty may require it.”16 But despite the broad sentiments of the Constitution,
state prisoners were not permitted to seek habeas relief in federal courts until
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.17 In the years since, the reach of the writ has
expanded. For example, it now extends to extraterritorial jurisdiction and
applies to noncitizens, like detainees in Guantanamo Bay.18 As the scope of
the writ expanded, however, procedural barriers to obtaining habeas review
increased.
A. AEDPA, Amended Sentences, and the “Second or Successive” Provision19
A major development in recent habeas corpus jurisprudence was the
1996 passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.20 The rel-
evant parts of this Act apply to state prisoners who submit habeas petitions
in federal court21 and were intended to expedite federal review of habeas pe-
titions.22 AEDPA has been widely criticized as ambiguous23 and confusing.24
The ambiguities in AEDPA could be explained by its inclusion of antiterror-
ism legislation; the Act was proposed and expediently passed25 in the wake of
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
17. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(2012)); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477–79 (1991); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical
Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1081
(1995).
18. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (finding that detainees in Guantanamo
Bay may petition for writs of habeas corpus).
19. There are many intricacies in this area of law. For the sake of brevity, this Note will
refer to motions and petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (2012) as habeas petitions gener-
ally; and will take other similar liberties, unless it is necessary to engage otherwise.
20. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
22. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 259–60
(2006).
23 . E .g ., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“All we can say is that in a world of
silk purses and pigs’ ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.”); Blume,
supra note 22, at 261 (“AEDPA’s framers chose arcane statutory language . . . that had no prior
habeas history or pedigree . . . . [which] left the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, with
little guidance regarding Congress’s intent.”).
24 . E .g ., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) (“AEDPA is
notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is replete with vague and ambiguous language, appar-
ent inconsistency, and plain bad grammar.”); Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal Habeas
Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 887, 887 (2012) (reviewing NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN,
HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011)) (“Everyone recognizes that federal habeas
doctrine is a mess.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Dodd v. United States, No.
04-5286 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2005) (“[W]ho’s responsible for writing this . . . ?”).
25. See Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Cor-
pus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 545–46 (2006) (detailing the history of AEDPA’s passage,
and how Republicans in Congress “seized the opportunity” and held no “committee hearings,
mark-up sessions, or similar opportunities for testing ideas” to get the bill “shot through com-
mittee in both bodies and . . . to the floor without an explanatory report”).
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the Oklahoma City bombings.26 Another possible explanation is Congress’s
interest in preserving state courts’ authority,27 as “AEDPA was intended
more broadly ‘to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.’ ”28
Regardless of the explanation, AEDPA now governs federal habeas review. It
has become an integral part of habeas doctrine, and prisoners must reckon
with its procedural twists and turns.
One of the significant changes that AEDPA brought to habeas analysis
was a greater restriction on second or successive motions. Specifically, a
court of appeals must certify that any “second or successive” petitions con-
tain either: (1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable[,]”
or (2) newly discovered evidence which, if proven, would “establish by clear
and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty.”29 If the court of appeals finds that these requirements are
not satisfied, the petition is deemed “second or successive” and must be dis-
missed.30
This change presents a linguistic ambiguity. “Second or successive” is a
term of art31 left undefined by AEDPA32 that refers to any habeas petition
challenging the same judgment for which the petitioner had previously filed
a petition.33 In other words, it refers to habeas petition Y that challenges
judgment A when the petitioner had previously filed habeas petition X also
challenging judgment A. It does not necessarily refer to the second-in-time
habeas petition.34 “Second in time” is another term of art referring to any
numerically second habeas petition. For example, it refers to any habeas peti-
tion Y when the same petitioner previously filed habeas petition X, regard-
less of the claims present in either petition. All “second or successive”
26. Kovarsky, supra note 9, at 447.
27 . See Blume, supra note 22, at 260 (“[G]one were the days of a lone federal judge or
panel of judges routinely finding constitutional defects in state court convictions.”).
28. Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 285 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Duncan v. Walk-
er, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001)).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
30 . Id . § 2244(b)(3)(C).
31. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010).
32 . In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“The term
‘second or successive’ is not defined in § 2255 or elsewhere in AEDPA.”); Propes v. Quater-
man, 573 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2009) (“There is not, however, a definition in the AEDPA of
the term ‘second or successive’ application.”).
33. While AEDPA does not define “second or successive,” courts have. The Supreme
Court wrote, “The phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining. It takes its full meaning
from our case law, including decisions predating the enactment of [AEDPA].” Panetti v. Quar-
terman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007) (citation omitted). The circuits have interpreted this pre-
AEDPA caselaw to conclude that “second or successive” refers to the “abuse of the writ doc-
trine.” Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005). That is to ask, is the petitioner
abusing the system by including claims that could have been raised earlier? If the answer to
that question is yes, the petition is abusing the writ, and is therefore successive. See id .
34 . In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d at 1110; In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998).
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petitions are also “second in time,” but not all second-in-time petitions are
second or successive. Without a certification that a habeas petition is not
second or successive, the district court does not have jurisdiction to hear the
case.35 Prisoners seeking habeas review are thus severely limited in their abil-
ity to bring multiple habeas petitions,36 as their successive petition must raise
a claim that could not have been raised in their initial petition.37
Crucially for this discussion, if a petitioner has received a “new judg-
ment” after filing an initial habeas petition, a second-in-time habeas petition
raising claims based on the new judgment will not be deemed second or suc-
cessive.38 The term “new judgment” is also undefined and is a point of con-
tention among the circuit courts.39
B. Magwood, Patterson II, and the Shape of the Debate
Magwood v . Patterson is the Supreme Court case that interprets the sec-
ond or successive provision in the context of new judgments.40 Billy Joe
Magwood was sentenced to death for murdering an Alabama sheriff in
1979.41 Just days before his execution, Magwood’s application for a writ of
habeas corpus was granted.42 The district court upheld Magwood’s convic-
tion but vacated his sentence because the trial court failed to find mitigating
circumstances relating to Magwood’s mental state.43 The trial court held a
new sentencing hearing in 1986, and Magwood was again sentenced to
death.44 One year after AEDPA was passed, Magwood sought leave to file a
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)–(4) (“Before a second or successive application permitted by
this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application . . . . A district
court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of
appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the re-
quirements of this section.”); see also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152–53 (2007).
36. King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 155 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[AEDPA] does not take kindly
to repeat requests for habeas relief.”); United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“This requirement ‘creates a gatekeeping mechanism for the district court’s consideration of
successive applications for habeas relief.’ ”) (quoting Propes, 573 F.3d at 229); Lyn S. Entzeroth,
Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal
Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with
Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 77 (2005) (“Unfortunately, due to the
AEDPA’s changes to the rules governing successive motions . . . prisoners found the court-
house doors closed to them, or at least, quite difficult to pry open.” (footnote omitted)).
37 . In re Cain, 137 F.3d at 235 (“[A] later petition is successive when it: 1) raises a claim
challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an
earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ.” (citation omitted)).
38 . Panetti, 551 U.S. at 944.
39 . See infra Section II.0.
40. 561 U.S. 320 (2010).
41 . Magwood, 561 U.S. at 324.
42 . Id . at 326.
43 . Id .
44 . Id .
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habeas petition challenging his new death sentence, which the district court
conditionally granted.45 The district court first asked whether the application
was barred as successive for the purposes of AEDPA and concluded that it
was not.46 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the new claims raised
in his second-in-time habeas petition could have been brought at the time of
the first habeas petition.47 Because Magwood did not argue for one of the
statutory exceptions available for “second or successive” provisions, the cir-
cuit court dismissed his claim.48 The Supreme Court agreed with the district
court and reversed.49 The Court held that “the phrase ‘second or successive’
must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged”50 and that a
habeas petition is not “second or successive” if it challenges a “new judg-
ment” for the first time.51 Although the relevant AEDPA provision does not
define the term “second or successive,” the Supreme Court used a separate
provision of AEDPA to determine that the judgment was the baseline against
which the “second or successive” analysis must be conducted.52 Thus, a pris-
oner who obtains a new judgment will not be blocked by the second or suc-
cessive clause of AEDPA, as “the existence of a new judgment is
dispositive.”53
Magwood leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, how
should courts interpret the second or successive provision in cases where the
defendant challenges their underlying conviction but not the new sentence?54
Similarly, what should courts do with habeas challenges to the execution of a
sentence rather than the judgment?55 Most importantly, what is the defini-
tion of “new judgment”? The circuit courts have been left to define this piv-
otal term.56
45 . Id . at 327–28.
46 . Id . at 328.
47 . Id . at 329.
48 . Id .
49 . Id . at 331.
50 . Id . at 333.
51 . Id . at 323–24.
52 . Id . at 332–33 (looking to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012)).
53 . Id . at 338.
54 . Id . at 342.
55 . Id . at 338 n.12 (stating that “[w]e address only an application challenging a new
state-court judgment for the first time,” not “habeas petitions challenging the denial of good-
time credits or parole”).
56 . See In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 2017) (“That unanswered question is pre-
cisely the one before us . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2015); Suggs
v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Because the question before us is settled in
our circuit and the Supreme Court considered the question but expressly declined to answer it,
we follow our circuit’s precedents . . . .”); Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Although the court had ‘no occasion to address’ the precise scenario this case presents,
we conclude, as a matter of first impression . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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Patterson II57 demonstrates the need to answer these questions. Follow-
ing his conviction for capital sexual battery, Ace Patterson was sentenced to
311 months imprisonment with a consecutive life sentence and chemical
castration.58 Eight years later, Patterson filed a habeas corpus petition chal-
lenging his conviction, but the petition was dismissed as untimely.59 After
the dismissal, Patterson filed a motion to correct his sentence, challenging
the chemical castration portion of his sentence as illegal under Florida law.60
The trial court granted his motion and amended his sentence to exclude
chemical castration.61
Patterson then filed another habeas petition, which was dismissed by the
district court as successive under AEDPA.62 A three-judge panel of the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed, with the concurring opinion finding that the “case is
not hard.”63 The panel permitted Patterson’s claim to go forward on what it
deemed a second-in-time habeas petition that was not a “second or succes-
sive” petition.64 But an en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed the panel’s finding
in a 6–5 decision, despite the panel’s reaction that the case was “not hard.”
The court found that the removal of chemical castration from Patterson’s
sentence was not a “new judgment.”65 In addition to the determination that
he did not have a new judgment, the court also found that Patterson did not
qualify for any other statutory exceptions to second or successive petitions.66
Thus, Patterson was unable to bring his claim.67 Patterson II brings the crux
of the problem into focus: there are significant inconsistencies among the
circuits’ interpretations of the second or successive provision of AEDPA that
illogically limit access to habeas relief.
II. CIRCUIT INCONSISTENCIES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM
Given the current landscape of interpretations of “second or successive,”
it is difficult to determine when the habeas “count” is reset for purposes of
finding a habeas petition second or successive under AEDPA. There have
been several confusing and inconsistent decisions since Magwood. These in-
consistencies erode review of federal law and raise due process concerns,
57. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017)
(en banc).
58 . Id . at 1323.
59 . Id . at 1324.
60 . Id .
61 . Id .
62 . Id .
63. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson I), 812 F.3d 885, 894 (11th Cir.
2016) (Haikala, J., concurring specially).
64 . Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1324.
65 . Id . at 1325–26.
66 . Id . at 1327.
67 . See id . at 1328.
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highlighting the need for a clear resolution that protects the rights of prison-
ers and detainees.
A. Circuit Inconsistencies
Although circuit courts agree with Magwood’s holding that a “new
judgment” resets the habeas count,68 they disagree on how to define the
term.69 This disagreement has left room for circuit courts to split on two is-
sues: what constitutes a “judgment,” and what makes a judgment “new.”
1. What is a “Judgment”?
Nearly every circuit court has recognized that the new judgment analysis
considers changes to both the conviction70 and the sentence.71 The Seventh
Circuit is an outlier, finding in Suggs v . United States72 that the conviction
and sentence are analyzed separately, depending on which component is be-
ing challenged in the second-in-time petition.73 Imagine the following sce-
nario: a court enters an order that changes the offense for which a petitioner
is convicted but carries the same sentence as the original conviction. In this
scenario, under the Seventh Circuit interpretation, the petitioner obtained a
new judgment only for purposes of a second-in-time petition challenging the
altered conviction, not the unaltered sentence. In every other circuit, the
68 . In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 142–143 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d
154 (6th Cir. 2015)) (looking to the other circuits to conclude that when a habeas petition chal-
lenges a new judgment, it is not successive); In re Brown, 594 F. App’x 726 (3d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam); Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014); Wentzell v.
Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2010).
69 . See United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2015) (“While Magwood es-
tablishes that a habeas application challenging a ‘new judgment’ is not second or successive, it
does not define the term ‘new judgment.’ ”).
70. Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1328–29 (Carnes, C.J., concurring) (noting that the court
did not get to answer that question); In re Gray, 850 F.3d at 142 (finding a “judgment” is a con-
viction and a sentence); King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding similarly);
In re Brown, 594 F. App’x at 729 (adopting the Second Circuit’s approach in Johnson); In-
signares, 755 F.3d at 1281 (“[W]hen a habeas petition is the first to challenge a new judgment,
it is not ‘second or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the sentence or the
underlying conviction.”); Wentzell, 674 F.3d at 1127 (adopting the Second Circuit’s approach
in Johnson and stating that “[t]he Supreme Court rejected such a ‘one opportunity rule’ in
Magwood”); Johnson, 623 F.3d at 46 (“[W]here a first habeas petition results in an amended
judgment, a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it challenges the con-
viction, the sentence, or both.”).
71. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156–57 (2007); In re Gray, 850 F.3d at 141–42 (cit-
ing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)); Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d
1286, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dodson, 291 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2002).
72. Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 2013).
73 . Id . at 282–83 (“We have held that [habeas] motions after resentencing . . . are second
or successive when they challenge the underlying conviction . . . . We conclude that because
Magwood expressly declined to extend its holding to the facts before us here, it did not disturb
our circuit’s precedent . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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change to the conviction would likely be considered a new judgment, regard-
less of the claims in the second-in-time petition.74
The Seventh Circuit panel deciding Suggs noted that other circuit courts
have interpreted Magwood more broadly.75 However, the Suggs court rea-
soned that Magwood’s failure to specifically address this question provided
all the room it needed to follow its own pre-Magwood precedent.76 Other
courts overturned their own precedents to find that the “judgment” analysis
always includes both the conviction and the sentence,77 but the Suggs court
refused to do the same. A crucial portion of the Magwood interpretation be-
came inconsistent because of the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on pre-Magwood
precedent—an inconsistency the Supreme Court could easily have avoided
by defining the term it created. Beyond this incongruity, the Suggs approach
overemphasizes the pre-AEDPA “abuse of the writ” standard for successive
habeas petitions. The court separated analysis of the sentence and the con-
viction to vindicate the restrictions on successive claims that AEDPA in-
tended.78 But as a result, the Suggs approach bars some second-in-time
habeas petitions even when there has been a significant change to a compo-
nent of the judgment.79 Thus, by refusing to embrace the more inclusive in-
terpretation adopted by other circuits, the Seventh Circuit placed procedural
concerns over the constitutional interests of the habeas petitioner.
The Suggs approach requires the procedural oddity of separating a peti-
tioner’s challenges to the conviction from those to the sentence.80 This is a
difficult task for courts to accomplish, as it is not always clear which is being
challenged.81 In some cases, it could be impossible to challenge one without
also challenging the other.82 The trouble petitioners would face in the same
exercise is of even greater concern. And even if petitioners can sufficiently
separate their claims, this system does not account for how that separation
74 . Id . at 284–85 (“We recognize that our reading of Magwood differs from the ap-
proach taken by other circuits. [The Ninth and Second C]ircuits found Magwood’s teaching
sufficiently clear to extend it to the circumstances before them. Here, however, where we have
clear circuit precedent directing us otherwise, we do not find Magwood’s guidance to be clear
enough to depart from our precedent.” (citations omitted)).
75 . Id .
76 . Id .
77. King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. United States, 623
F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 2010).
78 . See Suggs, 705 F.3d at 285 (“[O]ther circuits’ broader readings of Magwood have the
odd effect of interpreting AEDPA to relax limits on successive claims beyond the pre-AEDPA
standards.”).
79. For example, the deletion of the chemical castration punishment in Patterson II
would still bar a second-in-time petition with claims that challenge the underlying conviction.
See Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017) (en
banc).
80 . See King, 807 F.3d at 157–59.
81 . Id . at 158.
82 . Id .
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might shift a petitioner’s incentives.83 It is simply not feasible to consider
each component of the judgment in a vacuum.
2. What is a “New” Judgment?
The interpretation of the word “new” has been subject to much more
debate and inconsistency than the term “judgment.” These inconsistencies
can be grouped in relation to three categories: new sentencing proceedings,
correction of clerical errors, and the raising of claims that were available for
a prior petition.
First, circuit courts agree that when a prisoner is resentenced but re-
ceives the same punishment as in their original sentence, the prisoner none-
theless has a “new” judgment.84 A longer sentence,85 a change to a sentence
enhancement,86 or a different minimum term of imprisonment also consti-
tutes a “new” judgment.87 For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in In-
signares v . Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections that a reduced
minimum sentence from twenty to ten years constituted a new judgment.88
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in In re Weathersby.89 There,
the court vacated the state judgment that was the basis for a sentencing en-
hancement.90 It determined that this constituted a new judgment and reset
the habeas count.91
Yet receiving a lesser sentence may not constitute a new judgment.92 In
United States v . Jones, the Fifth Circuit adopted a slightly different definition
83 . Id . (“Suppose a defendant is convicted on two counts, and just one of them involves
a constitutional error. If the defendant receives five-year concurrent sentences on both convic-
tions, his incentives to challenge the defective conviction in his first habeas application is low;
success on that challenge alone will not change his time in jail. If resentencing makes those
five-year sentences consecutive, however, his incentives change considerably, because success
now decreases his sentence by half.”).
84 . In re Brown, 594 F. App’x 726, 726–27, 729 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a petitioner
who was originally sentenced to life in prison and received the same sentence after his resen-
tencing proceedings had a new judgment); Blanco v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 688 F.3d 1211,
1240 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that a judgment can be an “intervening judgment” even if it
imposes the same sentence as the first judgment); Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1125–27
(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that resentencing that deletes part of the sentence and reissues the
otherwise exact same sentence resets the habeas counter).
85 . King, 807 F.3d at 156. King was resentenced and received a longer minimum sen-
tence than he had originally, and the court found this to be a “new” judgment. Id .
86. For example, a change to habitual offender status.
87. Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014); In re
Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Stewart v. United States, 646
F.3d 856, 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
88. 775 F.3d at 1277–78.
89. 717 F.3d 1108.
90 . In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d at 1109.
91 . Id . at 1111.
92. United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 484–85 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that a sentence
reduction is not a “new judgment” after Jones had his life sentence reduced to 405 months);
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for “new judgment” compared to most other circuits.93 The Fifth Circuit re-
viewed Jones’s second-in-time habeas petition after he received a new, modi-
fied sentence pursuant to a federal statute.94 The court wrote that a review of
the precedent “ma[de] clear that Jones . . . received a reduced sentence, not a
new one.”95 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that reissuing a sentence did not “re-
semble a full resentencing,” as this was a modification “of a term of impris-
onment.”96 It held that the federal statute through which Jones’s sentence
was modified was not a resentencing mechanism,97 concluding that “Jones
provides [the court] with no reason to depart from these interpretations of
§ 3582’s plain text.”98 Effectively, because Jones had his sentence altered in
the incorrect format (incorrect in the Fifth Circuit’s view of AEDPA), his
judgment was not “new.”99 The inconsistency between the Jones standard
and other circuit court standards demonstrates the need for a simpler, more
uniform “new judgment” test.
Second, the correction of clerical or typographical errors in a sentence
does not constitute a new judgment.100 A correction does not disturb the un-
derlying conviction, so the judgment is not “new.”101 But there is significant
disagreement on what constitutes a “clerical” or “typographical” error. In
Patterson II, the Eleventh Circuit likened vacating an illegal chemical castra-
tion sentence to the correction of a clerical error.102 To the court, that the
same sentence was issued again, with only the castration portion of the sen-
tence removed, prevented Patterson’s judgment from being considered
“new.”103 In the process, the Eleventh Circuit seemingly ignored its own
precedent from Insignares, in which it recognized that a minimum sentence
White v. United States, 745 F.3d 834, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that “Magwood does not
reset the clock or the count, for purposes of [AEDPA] when a prisoner’s sentence is reduced,”
and noting a “substantial difference between resentencing, and sentence reduction”); Suggs v.
United States, 705 F.3d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 2013) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Suggs had
received a new judgment, despite the majority’s finding that his petition was not second or
successive on other grounds).
93. 796 F.3d 483.
94 . See Jones, 796 F.3d at 485 (determining whether a sentence that has been reduced
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) qualifies as a “new judgment”).
95 . Id . (emphasis added).
96 . Id . at 485–86 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012)).
97 . Id . at 486 (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825 (2010)).
98 . Id .
99. And, accordingly, the habeas petition was “second or successive.” See id . at 485–87.
100 . In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585, 588–89 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Martin, 398 F. App’x 326,
327 (10th Cir. 2010).
101 . In re Martin, 398 F. App’x at 327.
102. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321, 1326–27 (11th
Cir. 2017) (en banc).
103 . Id .
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reduction was a new judgment.104 Although removing chemical castration
from a sentence could fairly be considered a sentence reduction, the Elev-
enth Circuit treated the issue differently in Patterson II. Typically, a clerical
correction involves circumstances more like remedying a sentence mistaken-
ly entered as one hundred years instead of ten,105 rather than the correction
of an illegal form of punishment.106
The Third Circuit held in In re Brown that when a sentence was over-
turned because of a procedural flaw, the reentry of an identical sentence was
more than a simple “mechanical correction of the docket” and constituted a
new judgment.107 This stands in stark contrast to the Patterson II decision, in
which even the entry of a different level of punishment was not viewed as a
new judgment.108 This inconsistency accentuates the need for a more con-
sistent model of interpretation of the “second or successive” clause of
AEDPA.
Third, the Court in Magwood made clear that the “judgment is disposi-
tive” for the “second or successive” provision analysis. 109 This means that all
considerations revolve around the judgment, not the specific habeas claim.
Yet some courts still apply a claims-based approach, holding that a judgment
is not new because the claims could have been brought in an earlier habeas
petition.110 For example, the petitioner in Suggs challenged only his convic-
tion, not his new sentence.111 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the
Supreme Court had left open the question of how to consider challenges to
the underlying conviction after an intervening judgment, it was free to apply
its own precedent and bypass Magwood’s holding that the “judgment is dis-
positive.”112 Thus, the court concluded that because the claims could have
been raised previously, the judgment was not “new.”113 The Supreme Court’s
instruction that the “judgment is dispositive” is distinct from the open ques-
tion of a second-in-time petition challenging an underlying conviction. But
104 . Id . at 1329 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d
1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the 2009 reduction of “Insignares’s mandatory-
minimum imprisonment sentence . . . . resulted in a new judgment” even though it “retained
his 27-year imprisonment sentence”).
105 . Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1332 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
106 . Id . at 1326 (majority opinion).
107. 594 F. App’x 726, 729 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
108 . Compare In re Brown, 594 F. App’x at 729, with Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1326.
109. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 338 (2010); see also White v. United States, 745
F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[Magwood] holds that the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
setting aside a sentence as invalid, followed by the imposition of a new sentence, resets the clock
and the count, so that an attack may be waged against the new sentence even if the same legal
grounds could have been urged against the original sentence.” (emphases added)).
110 . E .g ., In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 784–85 (4th Cir. 2016); Suggs v. United States, 705
F.3d 279, 284–85 (7th Cir. 2013).
111 . Suggs, 705 F.3d at 280.
112 . Id . at 282–84.
113 . Id . at 285.
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in order to adequately protect habeas petitioners’ access to relief, the Suggs
court should have recognized that the components of the judgment are inex-
tricable for purposes of the analysis.
The Fourth Circuit engaged in an almost identical analysis in In re
Wright.114 Despite the Supreme Court’s firm position, the Fourth Circuit also
reasoned that the petitioner challenged the “execution” of his sentence, as
opposed to the actual conviction or sentence.115 Like the Seventh Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit also cited pre-Magwood opinions as a basis for its decision.116
Both circuits diverged from the widely cited Johnson decision from the Sec-
ond Circuit, which had previously rejected the claims-based approach and
instead overturned its precedents that were incompatible with Magwood.117
The Seventh and Fourth Circuits were of course free to differ from their sis-
ter circuit’s conclusions in Johnson. But their refusal to follow Johnson is es-
pecially questionable considering that the majority of circuits that have
considered the question do.118 For example, in King v . Morgan, the Sixth Cir-
cuit considered both Suggs and Johnson before following the Johnson ap-
proach and overturning its own pre-Magwood precedents.119 The King court
concluded that the petitioner had obtained a new judgment, allowing him to
bring a new habeas petition even though his second-in-time petition raised
the same claims as his first-in-time petition.120 This was an informed and
careful rejection of the Suggs and Wright claims-based approach in favor of
the judgment-based approach from Magwood and Johnson.
The judgment approach is superior because it allows for a new habeas
petition after any judicial modification, whether to the sentence or to the
conviction. The claims-based approach, on the other hand, could prevent a
petitioner from filing a second-in-time petition even after their conviction
was significantly altered, changing their incentives for filing for habeas relief.
As the King court put it, the claims-based approach prohibits the “now-
more-critical challenge” to confinement, an outcome that “would make little
sense.”121 For example, the claims-based approach favored by the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits would have left the petition in King procedurally barred.122
114. 826 F.3d at 784.
115 . In re Wright, 826 F.3d at 777.
116 . Id . at 784 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991), and Noble v. Barnett,
24 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1994)).
117. Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 2010).
118 . See King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting that the Second,
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed the judgment-based approach).
119 . Id . at 156, 159.
120 . Id . at 156. The court in Insignares noted earlier that “[t]he Supreme Court also clari-
fied that the phrase ‘second or successive’ applies to habeas petitions, not the claims they raise.”
Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014).
121 . King, 807 F.3d at 159.
122 . See King v. Morgan, No. 1:12 CV 2000, 2013 WL 5531365, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
26, 2013) (listing the claims that King brought in his first petition and those that he brought in
his second petition, where there was some overlap).
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The judgment-based approach also makes more practical sense, as the
claims-based approach would become difficult to implement in cases where
petitioners bring multiple claims.123
Thus, there is a rift developing among the circuits on whether to apply a
claims-based or judgment-based approach. If unaddressed, this inconsisten-
cy has the potential to further complicate habeas doctrine despite the clarity
Magwood seemed to provide. Aside from consistency, there are even deeper
problems with an approach that subjugates the rights of habeas petitioners
due to an overvaluation of the state’s interests.
B. The Scope of the Problem
The failure to define “second or successive” has serious implications for
habeas petitioners.124 Because a petitioner cannot appeal a denial of authori-
zation on the “second or successive” issue,125 it is crucial that courts get the
determination correct on the first try. Approaches that overvalue the con-
cerns of the state run the risk of eliminating a petitioner’s legitimate claims.
The petitioner’s first opportunity to seek permission to bring a second habe-
as petition is their only opportunity. Given that access to habeas relief is an
implied constitutional right,126 the ambiguity and excessive restraint of a pe-
titioner’s final opportunity to vindicate that right is especially untenable.127
The dire need for consistency on a petitioner’s final opportunity for ac-
cess to habeas relief illustrates the ultimate stakes of the circuit split—the
sufficient availability of habeas review. Those opposed to expanding such
123 . King, 807 F.3d at 158.
124 . See Mark T. Pavkov, Comment, Does “Second” Mean Second?: Examining the Split
Among the Circuit Courts of Appeals in Interpreting AEDPA’s “Second or Successive” Limita-
tions on Habeas Corpus Petitions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1007, 1023 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme
Court needs to provide the courts of appeals with a clear, definitive interpretation of ‘second or
successive.’ The Court should definitively define what constitutes a ‘second or successive’ peti-
tion under § 2244(b) in order to resolve the split among the circuits, to curb the inconsistent
decisions within individual circuits, and to ensure that the circuits uniformly interpret ‘second
or successive’ in the future.”).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2012).
126. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744–45 (2008) (“The [Suspension] Clause pro-
tects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account.”); Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 327, 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1866) (“[E]very person restrained of his
liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if
unlawful.”); Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus in In-
ternational Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. U.C.L. J. INT’L L. 551, 563 (2008–2009) (“No right
is affirmatively granted. However, this prohibition and the inclusion of the term habeas corpus
clearly imply the existence of the right to habeas corpus.”).
127 . See Nathan Nasrallah, Comment, The Wall that AEDPA Built: Revisiting the Suspen-
sion Clause Challenge to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1147, 1167 (2016) (“States have the power to administer and enforce their own criminal
laws, but they do not have the power to violate federal rights in doing so.”).
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availability point to well-established concerns, such as the conservation of
judicial resources, the need for finality, and the protection of federalism.128
Justice Brennan wrote of these concerns about federalism, finality, and judi-
cial resources and concluded that they should not be considered equally
among constitutional claims.129 Justice Blackmun was even more critical,
calling invocations of comity, finality, and federalism a “crusade to erect pet-
ty procedural barriers” and “a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary,
and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights.”130 The
Justices were correct that the state’s interests are insufficient to justify the
status quo. Prioritizing those concerns presumes that they are more im-
portant than ensuring that a prisoner may assert their habeas right and at-
tack impermissible irregularities in their confinement. They are not.131
1. Promoting Federal Review of Federal Law
The need for federal review of detainment and the vindication of consti-
tutional rights should be prioritized over these less vital policy concerns. The
majority of habeas petitions are filed by prisoners held in state, rather than
federal, custody.132 So federal courts evaluating habeas petitions are in the
precarious position of reviewing decisions made by state courts, the instru-
ments of a coequal sovereign.133 Thus, a desire to respect the judgment of
state courts has underpinned federal habeas law for decades.134 Proponents
128. For an analysis of these concerns, see Kovarsky, supra note 9, at 453–57.
129. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 522–23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Philip
C. Chronakis, Cold Comfort for Change: Trends of Preclusion in Habeas Corpus Litigation, 76
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 17, 24–25 (1998) (noting that finality should not be considered in ha-
beas cases the same way it is in other civil claims because “[t]he liberty interest at stake for a
criminal defendant, incarceration or death[,] . . . heavily outweighs the interests of a civil de-
fendant”).
130. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758–59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Patrick J. Fuster, Comment, Taming Cerberus: The Beast at AEDPA’s Gates, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1325, 1354–55 (2017) (“Federal courts have abstracted AEDPA’s purposes to such
a high level of generality that they serve as a presumption in favor of the state respondent on all
contested issues of interpretation. When doing so, they ignore Justice Antonin Scalia’s ad-
monition that ‘[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.’ ” (quoting Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013))).
132. Jordan Gross, Through a Federal Habeas Corpus Glass, Darkly—Who Is Entitled to
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Tribal Court Under ICRA and How Will We Know if They Got
It?, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 28 (2017) (citing a U.S. federal courts report from 2014–2015 that
found 16,030 petitions from state prisoners and 2,417 from federal prisoners). A significant
majority of prisoners in the United States are held in state custody as opposed to federal custo-
dy. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2016, 3 tbl.1 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3C-AH9C].
133 . See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730–31.
134. These concerns were perhaps most neatly laid out in Coleman v . Thompson, in
which Justice O’Connor famously wrote:
This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the
States . . . .
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of the federalist critique of habeas review argue that even in the case of a new
judgment that refreshes habeas availability under the second or successive
provision of AEDPA, the state still has sovereign power to adjudicate prison-
ers’ claims in its own courts.135 Permitting expanded federal habeas review
assumes that state remedies are inadequate,136 though this presumption may
be unfounded.137 Further, they contend that preserving federalism’s balance
is essential to facilitate an open-ended dialogue that ultimately promotes
resolution of legal conflicts.138
These federalism interests, however important, do not outweigh the
need for federal review. As Justice Blackmun saw it, the commonly cited fed-
eralism concerns were unjustified, as he doubted not only that the states and
the federal government were coequal but also that the interests of federalism
were served by creating procedural schemes that limited review of state
judgments.139 To Justice Blackmun, properly employed federalism would
protect federal interests.140 Protecting the right to file appropriate second or
successive habeas petitions is one such opportunity to vindicate this vision of
federalism by ensuring state court decisions are subject to federal review.141
. . . .
. . . Without the [respect], a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this
Court could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners . . . an end run
around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the State’s in-
terest in enforcing its laws.
Id . at 726, 730–31.
135. Frederic M. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679, 1703 (2005)
(“To its staunchest critics, federal habeas review of state court decisions is (and has always
been) a blatant affront to state autonomy.”); see, e .g ., Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and
Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 467–68 (2018) (explaining that “[o]ne federalism interest
purportedly protected by procedural default doctrine is ‘the State’s sovereign power to punish
offenders’ ” (footnote omitted)).
136 . See, e .g ., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108–09 (1977)
(describing the historical underlying “assumption of lack of parity” between state and federal
remedies that favored the federal courts); see also Bloom, supra note 135, at 1704 (“[F]ederal
habeas review of state-court decisions does imply a federal distrust of state power, often quite
plainly.”).
137 . See Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (“AEDPA’s requirements reflect
a ‘presumption that state courts know and follow the law.’ ” (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537
U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).
138. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). This is an especially “academic” argument, rea-
soning that more voices in the room leads to more ideas which leads to better solutions. See id .
at 1049. For more on the “academic” arguments of opposing habeas viewpoints, see also Larry
W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2334–35 (1993).
139 . Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 . Id . at 759.
141 . See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 87–88 (2012).
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Indeed, over time, expanding habeas corpus review provided federal
judges with a check on states.142 It served as an assurance that state judges
would rule correctly on matters of federal law regarding prisoners or other-
wise face reversal from a reviewing federal judge.143 Current interpretations
of the “second or successive” provision threaten this principle. If a state
judge knows that they are unlikely to face habeas review after a prisoner’s
first habeas petition fails, the judge may not work as diligently to ensure that
a resentencing or sentence modification is in accordance with federal law.144
Worse, a state judge may even actively disregard federal law if they know ha-
beas review of their determination at the federal level is unlikely.145 To pro-
mote compliance with federal law, a federal forum is needed. This concern is
compounded by the overwhelming number of state prisoners in comparison
to federal prisoners, as almost all convictions are given in state court.146 A
check is needed to ensure the application of federal law, and that check di-
minishes in power when a habeas petition is dismissed on questionable pro-
cedural grounds. The federal courts need a better mode of analysis to
safeguard their power of review and protect the conception of federalism as a
check on state compliance.
142 . Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759–60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520–21 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“ ‘[T]he
threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established con-
stitutional standards.’ The availability of collateral review assures ‘that the lower federal and
state courts toe the constitutional line.’ ” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–64 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
144 . See id .
145 . See id . at 521 (“In effect, habeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to unconstitutional ac-
tions by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard to ensure that rights secured under the
Constitution and federal laws are not merely honored in the breach.”).
146. CARSON, supra note 132, at 3 tbl.1 (showing that in 2016, the total state prison popu-
lation was about 690% higher than the federal prison population (1,317,565 state prisoners ver-
sus 189,192 federal prisoners, including juveniles)); see also id . at 3 tbl.2 (indicating that in
2016, Texas had a prison population of 163,703, or one nearly equal to the total federal prison
population).
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2. Potential Constitutional Implications147
Prisoners have a right to effective federal habeas review.148 But the in-
consistencies from the Supreme Court’s failure to fully address the questions
raised in Magwood highlight the ineffectiveness of the review process for
these habeas petitions. It is true that the Supreme Court has repeatedly up-
held the constitutionality of AEDPA’s provisions,149 and the prerogative to
limit habeas relief belongs to the legislative branch.150 Yet the application of
AEDPA could nevertheless violate due process if it denies petitioners’ rights
to habeas corpus protection.151
147. There are several constitutional concerns that could be raised regarding the recent
interpretations of the second or successive provision of AEDPA. The discussion here is not
exhaustive. For discussion of Suspension Clause concerns in second or successive AEDPA in-
terpretations, see Scott R. Grubman, What a Relief? The Availability of Habeas Relief Under the
Savings Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C. L. REV. 369 (2012); Randal S. Jeffrey, Suc-
cessive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging Procedural and Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43
(2000); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV.
275 (2008); Pavkov, supra note 124, at 1027–29; Kyle P. Reynolds, Comment, “Second or Suc-
cessive” Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims After Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1475, 1505–08 (2007); and Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus:
Successive Petitions Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1115, 1127–35 (1998). For discussion of Sixth Amendment issues, see Emily Garcia
Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts
Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1219 (2012). For a separation of powers discussion, see Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux,
97 VA. L. REV. 61 (2011), and Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699 (2002) (wondering if
the creators of AEDPA intended to create a statutory system with severe preclusive effects on
successive petitions).
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744–45 (2008) (“The [Suspension] Clause pro-
tects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account.”); Resolution of the New York Ratifying Convention, supra note 126, at 328
(“[E]very person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such
restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful.”); see also Farrell, supra note 126, at 563 (“No
right is affirmatively granted. However, this prohibition and the inclusion of the term habeas
corpus clearly imply the existence of the right to habeas corpus.”); Marceau, supra note 8, at 10
(“Even those who advocate for a very narrow scope of federal habeas review recognize Frank as
setting a constitutional floor. As a matter of due process, Frank acknowledges that federal ha-
beas review must, at an absolute minimum, provide the sort of scrutiny of state court decisions
that res judicata dictates in the realm of civil litigation.”).
149. Marceau, supra note 141, at 87–88.
150. Marceau, supra note 8, at 4 n.8 (quoting Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Reliti-
gation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 960 (1998)); see also Frank v. Mag-
num, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915) (“There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in order to safeguard the liberty of all
persons . . . .”).
151. Marceau, supra note 8, at 49 (“As currently applied, the AEDPA violates due process
when federal courts engage in limited or deferential review of a state process that is not fun-
damentally fair.”).
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Consider two fundamentals of due process. First, “[t]he touchstone of
due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of gov-
ernment.”152 Second, “[d]ue process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not
a yardstick . . . . It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving
the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.”153 Federal courts using the claims-based approach
work against this “delicate process” with their recent formalistic interpreta-
tions of the “second or successive” provision of AEDPA. It is unfair to expect
petitioners to navigate the habeas barriers created by the claims-based ap-
proach to second or successive petitions.154 Habeas petitioners are often un-
represented or underrepresented,155 which heightens the unfairness of
navigating a fractured and ambiguous body of law.156 The distinction be-
tween the different routes to obtaining a new judgment “might be thought a
semantic quibble,”157 but courts do not treat it that way.
The conservation of judicial resources must be considered in any discus-
sion of reforming habeas law. But this factor alone does not justify the pro-
government approach utilized by the Patterson II and Suggs courts in their
interpretations of the second or successive provision. Currently, the balance
of interests seems to vindicate a point Justice Blackmun foreshadowed when
he wrote that the only way to reconcile conflicting procedural requirements
favoring the state “is the principle that habeas relief should be denied when-
ever possible.”158 The myriad of recent circuit court decisions makes this
problem worthy of redress. It highlights the need to provide a check on the
states and an incentive for judges to actively engage with difficult cases, as
well as the risk to meaningful due process rights for incarcerated petitioners.
The Supreme Court has recognized that even if meritorious claims are in the
152. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 123 (1889)).
153. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring).
154 . See Kimberly A. Thomas, Substantive Habeas, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1749, 1764–65
(2014) (“These procedural cases gave rise to habeas doctrines that are, at best, convoluted and
difficult to understand. The complexity of habeas procedure is exacerbated because . . . state
inmates who are not subject to capital sentences rarely have a lawyer representing them in fed-
eral habeas. This means that state prisoners may initially mis-present the issues for the federal
courts’ consideration and may omit important aspects of the argument or ramifications of
their positions . . . . This frustration of inmates is intentional. Yet, it is not without important
systemic implications because inmates come to perceive the criminal system as a cruel and un-
just game in which the courts avoid hearing their claims, no matter how meritorious.”).
155. King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 2015).
156 . See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad.”).
157. White v. United States, 745 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014).
158. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 439 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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minority, “our procedures must ensure that those few claims are not stifled
by undiscriminating generalities,” and “[t]he complexities of our federal-
ism . . . are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules which, by avoiding some
abuses, generate others.”159
III. A SIMPLER INTERPRETATION OF NEW JUDGMENT: COMPARE WHAT IS
CLAIMED AS NEW WITH WHAT CAME BEFORE
A simpler method for determining when a judgment is new is needed to
better protect the interests of petitioners and ensure that courts make correct
determinations in such a final matter. This Part proposes a properly crafted
interpretation that protects both the interests of the petitioner and the inter-
ests of the state.
When considering whether a “new judgment” was issued, courts should
evaluate whether there has been any judicial change to the original judg-
ment. To accomplish this, the reviewing judge should compare the original
judgment entered by the trial court at sentencing with what is being labeled
as “new” by the habeas petitioner. If the former judgment is different in any
way from the latter, it should be considered “new” and the habeas count
should be reset to zero. A judgment is “different” whenever any alteration is
officially made, aside from simple corrections of clerical errors. This would
include any change to the sentence or conviction, even if it is merely “modi-
fied.”160 This covers an increase or decrease in the amount of time to be
served, or a different form of punishment imposed, such as relief from the
death penalty or altered terms of supervised release. This would focus the at-
tention on only judicially entered changes, allowing sentence modifications
to be considered equally alongside official new judgments.161 This solution
would adequately resolve the inconsistent interpretation of Magwood’s “new
judgment” rule while remaining compatible with the Magwood decision
more generally. This approach would also better serve habeas petitioners,
who would have a clearer rule—and thus a fairer rule—to follow as they at-
tempt to navigate habeas pro se.162
This solution would allow an exception for the correction of genuine
clerical errors. To prevent another Patterson II, “clerical error” should be de-
fined as only typographical errors, thus restoring “clerical error” to its tradi-
tional definition.163 Even with this exception, the analysis would be a simple
two-step test: first, is the judgment different; second, was the change entered
159. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
160. “Modified” is a generic term to refer to any process by which the court alters the
judgment without formally entering a new judgment.
161. Something that was not done in United States v . Jones, 796 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2015).
If it had been considered the same, the court would have been able to find that the judgment
was “new.” See id . at 485–86.
162 . See Thomas, supra note 154, at 1764–65.
163 . See Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321, 1331–32
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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by a judicial body. Both factors are easily determined and would minimally
expend judicial resources.
This proposed interpretation also provides that only a judicial modifica-
tion to a sentence or conviction should be considered a “new judgment,” not
changes imposed by another body. This contrasts with a similar but overly
broad solution that has already been proposed.164 That proposal would allow
a new challenge any time there was any change to the conviction or sentence,
regardless of the governmental body imposing the modification.165 This solu-
tion creates a scheme in which petitioners are permitted to file new habeas
claims whenever minor factors unrelated to their court-issued judgment
change, such as their custody level, parole status, or even their amount of
“good time.” This is overly inclusive. For example, changes in custody level
or the assignment of good time are decisions made by the prison system,
which is typically administered by an executive branch agency.166 Allowing a
petitioner to claim a “new judgment” when there was no court action goes
beyond the traditional understanding that a judgment comes from a court.167
If this model were adopted, the system could easily be abused; petitioners
could argue they have standing when only minor changes to the details of
their incarceration were made. The purpose of AEDPA was to eliminate
frivolous claims.168 Although some courts may have taken that imperative
too far, the overly broad interpretation would similarly go too far in weaken-
ing the “second or successive” bar on truly frivolous petitions.
The en banc Patterson II majority wrote that if a solution similar to the
one advocated for by this Note were implemented, state prisoners might be
worse off in accessing federal habeas review of their sentences.169 If access to
164. Thomas Burch, “New Judgment” and the Federal Habeas Statutes, 8 CALIF. L. REV.
ONLINE 88 (2017).
165 . Id . at 98 (“Admittedly, this defines new judgment somewhat broadly. Applying it
would mean, for example, that adding a post-release control requirement to a prisoner’s sen-
tence would be a new judgment, as would eliminating one count of a multi-count judgment,
even if it in no way affected the prisoner’s sentence. Eliminating a habitual offender designa-
tion would qualify, too. So would changing a prisoner’s restitution obligation, invalidating a
prisoner’s chemical castration requirement, and amending a prisoner’s judgment to include
earned good-time credit. In short, quite a few changes will satisfy this basic test.” (footnotes
omitted)).
166 . See Michele Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight Mechanisms Across the
United States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754, 1755 (2010). For a centralized data-
base of each state’s corrections department, see Correction Departments by State, USA GOV,
https://www.usa.gov/corrections [https://perma.cc/DNG8-JQUX].
167 . Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court’s final determination
of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case.” (emphasis added)).
168. James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1063, 1082 (2008)
(“In 1995, in order to ‘curb the abuse of the habeas corpus process, and particularly to address
the problem of delay and repetitive litigation in capital cases,’ Congress enacted [AEDPA].”
(footnote omitted)).
169. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (“As a practical matter, Patterson’s proposed resolution of this appeal might
hurt prisoners more than it helps.”).
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habeas corpus were expanded for new judgments, then state courts would be
unwilling to amend sentences in an attempt to limit prisoners’ chances of
habeas review.170 The dissenting judge in Patterson lambasted this argument,
writing: “The majority’s underlying assumption . . . is as odd as it is discon-
certing. If the majority is right, however, then the trust we place in state
courts to adjudicate issues of federal law . . . is completely misplaced, and the
deference we give them under AEDPA is a colossal and unjustified mis-
take.”171 The original Patterson I panel also noted, “[t]he notion that a trial
judge would refrain from correcting a sentencing error that all of the parties
have acknowledged . . . to avoid a potential habeas petition is repugnant to
the judicial office.”172 It seems difficult, if not impossible, to predict how
states would react to this change. Even assuming that state judges would act
the way the en banc majority feared, the federal courts are still a safeguard.
The majority’s fears were overstated.
A review of post-Magwood decisions shows that this Note’s proposed
reading of AEDPA would increase consistency and align circuits courts. The
Eleventh Circuit’s Patterson II rule requires an entirely new judgment to be
entered for Magwood to be applicable, which ignores the significant altera-
tions to judgments that the elimination or addition of a term of incarcera-
tion can create.173 The proposed solution eliminates that possibility, as a
change in the chemical castration portion of a sentence would constitute a
“new judgment” under the proposed reading. This would restore the Elev-
enth Circuit to its Insignares precedent.174 Meanwhile, the proposed solution
would preserve the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Gray; because Gray’s sen-
tence was altered from capital punishment to life imprisonment, this would
be a “new judgment” under the proposed model just as it was for the Fourth
Circuit.175 The Sixth Circuit’s King decision would be unchanged, as receiv-
ing a longer minimum sentence would still amount to a “new judgment.”
This solution would also affirm that the interpretation is not claims-based
but judgment-based, suggesting that Suggs and Lampton be decided as In-
170 . Id .
171 . Id . at 1333 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
172. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson I), 812 F.3d 885, 895 (11th Cir.
2016) (Haikala, J., concurring), vacated, 849 F.3d 1321 (2017).
173 . Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1326.
174 . Cf . id . at 1332 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“Imagine a case in which a Florida court sen-
tences a defendant to a term of 10 years, but then issues a judgment which mistakenly states
that the sentence is 100 years. No one notices the error until the defendant has been in custody
for 6 years. If the state court issues a new judgment which corrects the clerical error and com-
mits the defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections for (the correct) 10 years,
that will, according to the majority’s apparent rationale, constitute a new judgment under
Magwood.”).
175 . In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2017).
1692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1669
signares and Johnson were.176 In sum, courts that encounter this question
would issue more consistent decisions under this proposed model.
Crucially, the proposed solution would promote efficient use of re-
sources by federal courts deciding the second or successive question. Con-
serving judicial resources is one of the three classic considerations of any
habeas procedural rule, along with principles of federalism and concerns of
finality.177 The conservation of resources, then, should make this solution as
appealing to the habeas traditionalist as to the habeas reformer. Habeas liti-
gation, and prisoner litigation in general, has developed to the point of be-
coming “an entire subsection of the judiciary,”178 exacerbating the resources
drain. The specter of frivolous lawsuits wasting time is a concern that con-
tinues today but was particularly prevalent in the time leading up to the pas-
sage of AEDPA.179
The expansion of habeas claims has forced the expansion of the courts as
well, in both the number of judges and the size of their research staffs.180
There are concerns that the growing size of the judiciary’s bureaucracy could
create a “monster in the judicial closet,” as judges are forced to rely on their
staff rather than make independent decisions.181 Research indicates a high
correlation between the recommendations of the research staff and the cor-
responding judicial outcomes, supporting the notion that judges are losing
their independent decisionmaking power as resources are stretched too
thin.182
Those who view extended post-conviction litigation as a “waste” of re-
sources disapprove not just of the “waste” itself but also of the detriment to
the rehabilitation process.183 Under this view, a prisoner who challenges their
conviction acts in defiance or to stifle prison management, both of which ul-
timately prohibit rehabilitation.184 The “waste” can also be harmful to genu-
176 . Compare Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2013), and In re Lamp-
ton, 667 F.3d 585, 588–89 (5th Cir. 2012), with Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d
1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014), and Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2010).
177 . See Suggs, 705 F.3d at 285 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001)).
178. Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 21, 21 (1994) (calling all of prisoner-brought civil litigation, which in-
cludes habeas petitions, “an entire subsection of the judiciary”).
179 . Id . at 30–31 (“Meritorious prisoner civil rights cases will continue to be buried un-
less the deluge of prisoner cases can be stopped.”); Ira P. Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certifi-
cate of Probable Cause, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 307 (1983) (criticizing the failure of the then-existing
statutory scheme to prevent frivolous habeas petitions).
180. Doumar, supra note 178, at 21.
181 . Id . at 28 (quoting Mary Lou Stow & Harold J. Spaeth, Centralized Research Staff: Is
There a Monster in the Judicial Closet?, 75 JUDICATURE 216 (1992)).
182 . Id . at 30.
183. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prison-
ers, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963).
184. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126–27 (1982) (“[T]he individual criminal defendant
and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that
comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a
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ine petitions. Justice Jackson noted that “[i]t must prejudice the occasional
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.”185
Overemphasizing the concerns about judicial economy is ultimately
harmful to the review of habeas petitions and to the development of habeas
law. The potential for frivolous claims calls for clear and functional proce-
dures that enable meaningful review, not ever-increasing measures aimed at
policing for illegitimate petitions.186 Consider the classic needle in the hay-
stack analogy: “He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”187 This is the
risk some courts, such as the Patterson II majority, run in their interpreta-
tion of the “second or successive” petitions.188 Creating a system that allows
for broad rejection of second or successive petitions greatly decreases the
closeness of the examination. A court that incorrectly identifies a second-in-
time habeas petition as a statutorily barred second or successive petition cre-
ates a thorny issue for the reviewing circuit court, to say nothing about the
abhorrent position imposed upon the petitioner.
It is possible that this would oversimplify the habeas consideration pro-
cess and obliterate the distinctions between the different habeas motions and
the procedural paths of petitioners’ respective cases. But this simplicity is ex-
actly why this solution is ideal. The process is too complex for habeas peti-
tioners to navigate pro se—and, because most petitioners proceed pro se, the
process is too complex for most petitioners.189 The process must be simple
enough that unrepresented petitioners can reasonably understand the pro-
ceedings in which they are participating. Simplifying the process is also nec-
essary to guarantee that the petitioners can exercise their constitutional
conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful
place in the community.”); Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal
Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 571
(“[D]efendants who are allowed to appeal may remain recalcitrant, which may prevent rehabil-
itation.”).
185. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
186 . Id . at 536. (“The fact that the substantive law . . . invite[s] farfetched or border-line
petitions makes it important to adhere to procedures which enable courts readily to distinguish
a probable constitutional grievance from a convict’s mere gamble on persuading some indul-
gent judge to let him out of jail. Instead, this Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of
the writ until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the low-
er courts and swell our own.”).
187 . Id . at 537.
188. Doumar, supra note 178, at 30–31 (“It appears the handling of prisoner petitions is
becoming a judgeless system. Many prisoner complaints never receive more than a cursory
review from a federal judge at either the district or appellate level. Meritorious prisoner civil
rights cases [a term the author uses to broadly refer to all prisoner civil cases, which includes
habeas petitions] will continue to be buried unless the deluge of prisoner cases can be
stopped.”).
189 . See Jon O. Newman, Foreword, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1996) (“Prisoner lawsuits challenging prison condi-
tions share two characteristics. Nearly all these lawsuits are filed pro se, and the vast majority
are dismissed as frivolous.”).
1694 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1669
rights. The proposed interpretation would easily allow petitioners to deter-
mine if they have a “new” judgment. They would only need to discover if
there was a judicial action leading to different terms of their sentence. If no
court was involved, they do not have a new sentence.
The solution would also not require changes to AEDPA. This is a solu-
tion of judicial interpretation, not a legislative proposition. The precedent
for these changes is already present in the Supreme Court’s Magwood deci-
sion. This may seem a sweeping liberalization of AEDPA, which could lead
to abuse of the system, but these situations of a meritorious “second or suc-
cessive” habeas petition are “a rare circumstance.”190 The proposal would on-
ly clarify a tumultuous area of law for the great benefit of a few at a small
cost; indeed, the simplicity provided by this solution may benefit the courts
as much as it does the petitioners. This would not defeat AEDPA’s intended
purpose of limiting truly frivolous habeas petitions, but it would ensure the
presentation of legitimate habeas petitions to the courts.
Finally, each of the factors addressed here must reckon with the simple
truth that there are few individuals who would find themselves in the situa-
tion described by this Note. Habeas petitioners tend to be prisoners serving
long sentences, leaving the prisoners serving shorter sentences out of the
equation altogether.191 Successive habeas petitions exacerbate this considera-
tion—petitioners must serve a long enough sentence to still be in custody af-
ter completing the entire state review process and one round of federal
review.192 So why should a widely used statutory system be altered for the
sake of a very few if only to simply correct circuit inconsistency? After all,
such a solution threatens the states’ interests in the finality of judgments, the
courts’ interest in the preservation and efficient allocation of judicial re-
sources, and principles of federalism.193 The answer must be that it does not
matter how few individuals find themselves in such a position. Writs of ha-
beas corpus are the vehicles through which prisoners assert problems of fed-
eral law—including constitutional claims—in their convictions. A flaw in the
process of bringing a habeas petition is a structural flaw in the presentation
of constitutional issues, and one that simply cannot be allowed to continue
regardless of how few it benefits.194
190 . In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 2017).
191. Garcia Uhrig, supra note 147, at 1280 (“[B]ecause inmates must still be ‘in custody’
as well as have completed the direct appellate process in order to file a federal habeas petition,
federal habeas petitioners are typically those serving long sentences.”).
192. NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS 4 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5LLN-ADPE].
193 . See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507
U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (“Finally, and most importantly, eliminating review of [certain habeas
claims] would not significantly benefit the federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdic-
tion, or advance the cause of federalism in any substantial way.”).
194. Habeas law is a method through which petitioners can challenge the structural (or
procedural) adequacy of the state procedures leading to their convictions. See Eve Brensike
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Reforming recent interpretations of the “second or successive” provision
is necessary to ensure that every meritorious second-in-time habeas petition
is reviewed in the most efficient way possible. The proposed solution accom-
plishes such a reform. With the relatively simple solution proposed, courts
determining if a habeas petition is “second or successive” will rapidly and
more accurately determine the correct result that Magwood intended.
CONCLUSION
AEDPA was intended to limit the number of frivolous habeas petitions
that prisoners file, but the balance between weeding out the frivolous peti-
tions and protecting the valid ones is in danger. To ensure the continued vi-
ability of habeas petitions, reform is needed to solve the inconsistencies in
interpretations of the “second or successive” provision.
Interpreting “new judgment” to mean any different sentence, whether a
change in the amount of time served or a court ordered condition of con-
finement, is the optimal solution. Like Justice Blackmun stated, there is cur-
rently “a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable
impediments to the vindication of federal rights.”195 This reading would alle-
viate the noted discrepancies and concerns while preserving AEDPA’s ability
to screen out genuinely frivolous habeas petitions.
Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural Approach to Adequacy Doc-
trine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75, 79–80 (2017). Would it not be intolerably ironic for the tool of as-
serting procedural flaws to itself suffer from procedural flaws? This might seem tantamount to
asserting that there is a constitutional right to file a habeas corpus claim, which is not neces-
sarily the case, though it is clearly implied by the Suspension Clause. See supra note 126.
195. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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